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Abstract
We investigate infinite games on finite graphs where the information flow is perturbed by non-
deterministic signalling delays. It is known that such perturbations make synthesis problems
virtually unsolvable, in the general case. On the classical model where signals are attached to
states, tractable cases are rare and difficult to identify.
In this paper, we propose a model where signals are detached from control states, and we
identify a subclass on which equilibrium outcomes can be preserved, even if signals are delivered
with a delay that is finitely bounded. To offset the perturbation, our solution procedure combines
responses from a collection of virtual plays following an equilibrium strategy in the instant-
signalling game to synthesise, in a Dr. Frankenstein manner, an equivalent equilibrium strategy
for the delayed-signalling game.
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1 Introduction
Appropriate behaviour of an interactive system component often depends on events generated
by other components. The ideal situation, in which perfect information is available across
components, occurs rarely in practice – typically a component only receives signals more or
less correlated with the actual events. Apart from imperfect signals generated by the system
components, there are multiple other sources of uncertainty due to actions of the system
environment or to unreliable behaviour of the infrastructure connecting the components: For
instance, communication channels may delay or lose signals, or deliver them in a different
order than they were emitted. Coordinating components with such imperfect information to
guarantee optimal system runs is a significant, but computationally challenging, problem,
in particular when the interaction is of infinite duration. It appears worthwhile to study
the different sources of uncertainty in separation rather than as a global phenomenon, to
understand their computational impact on the synthesis of multi-component systems.
In this paper, we consider interactive systems modelled by concurrent games among
multiple players with imperfect information over finite state-transition systems, or labelled
graphs. Each state is associated to a stage game in which the players choose simultaneously
and independently a joint action, which triggers a transition to a successor state and generates
a local payoff and possibly further private signals to each player. Plays correspond to infinite
paths through the graph and yield to each player a global payoff according to a given
aggregation function, such as mean payoff, limit superior payoff, or parity. As solutions to
such games, we are interested in synthesising Nash equilibria in pure strategies, i.e., profiles
of deterministic strategies that are self-enforcing when prescribed to all players by a central
coordinator.
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The basic setting is standard for the automated verification and synthesis of reactive
modules that maintain ongoing interaction with their environment seeking to satisfy a
common global specification. Generally, imperfect information about the play is modelled as
uncertainty about the current state in the underlying transition system, whereas uncertainty
about the actions of other players is not represented explicitly. This is because the main
question concerns distributed winning strategies, i.e., Nash equilibria in the special case where
the players have a common utility function and should each receive maximal payoff. If every
player wins when all follow the prescribed strategy, unilateral deviations cannot be profitable
and any reaction to them would be ineffective, hence there is no need to monitor actions
of other players. Accordingly, distributed winning strategies can be defined on (potential)
histories of visited states, independently of the history of played actions. Nevertheless, these
games are computationally intractable in general, already with respect to the question of
whether distributed winning strategies exist [12, 11, 1].
However, if no equilibria exist that yield maximal payoffs to all players in a game, and
we consider arbitrary Nash equilibria rather than distributed winning strategies, it becomes
crucial for a player to monitor the actions of other players. To illustrate, one elementary
scheme for constructing equilibria in games of infinite duration relies on grim-trigger strategies:
cooperate on the prescribed equilibrium path until one player deviates, and at that event,
enter a coalition with the remaining players and switch to a joint punishment strategy against
the deviator. Most procedures for constructing Nash equilibria in games for verification and
synthesis are based on this scheme, which relies essentially on the ability of players to detect
jointly the deviation [15, 17, 5, 4].
The grim-trigger scheme works well under perfect, instant monitoring, where all players
have common knowledge about the most recent action performed by any other player. In
contrast, the situation becomes more complicated when players receive only imperfect signals
about the actions of other players, and worse, if the signals are not delivered instantly, but
with uncertain delays that may be different for each player. Imagine a scenario with three
players, where Player 1 deviates from the equilibrium path and this is signalled to Player 2
immediately, but only with a delay to Player 3. If Player 2 triggers a punishment strategy
against Player 1 as soon as she detects the deviation, Player 3 may monitor the action of
Player 2 as a deviation from the equilibrium and trigger, in his turn, a punishment strategy
against her, overthrowing the equilibrium outcome to the profit of Player 1.
Our contribution
We study the effect of imperfect, delayed monitoring on equilibria in concurrent games.
Towards this, we first introduce a refined game model in which observations about actions
are separated from observations about states, and we incorporate a representation for
nondeterministic delays for observing action signals. To avoid the general undecidability
results from the basic setting, we restrict to the case where the players have perfect information
about the current state.
Our main result is that, under the assumption that the delays are uniformly bounded,
every equilibrium payoff in the variant of a game where signals are delivered instantly is
preserved as an equilibrium payoff in the variant where they are delayed. To prove this, we
construct strategies for the delayed-monitoring game by combining responses for the instant-
monitoring variant in such a way that any play with delayed signals corresponds to a shuﬄe
of several plays with instant signals, which we call threads. Intuitively, delayed-monitoring
strategies are constructed, in a Frankenstein manner, from a collection of instant-monitoring
equilibrium strategies. Under an additional assumption that the payoff structure is insensitive
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to shuﬄing plays, this procedure allows to transfer equilibrium payoffs from the instant to
the delayed-monitoring game.
Firstly, the transfer result can be regarded as an equilibrium existence theorem for games
with delayed monitoring based on classes of games with instant monitoring that admit
equilibria in pure strategies. Defining existence conditions is a fundamental prerequisite to
using Nash equilibrium as a solution concept. If an application model leads to games that
may not admit equilibria, this is a strong reason to look for another solution concept. As
mixed strategies are conceptually challenging in the context of infinite games, guarantees for
pure equilibrium existence are particularly desirable.
Secondly, our result establishes an outcome equivalence between games with instant
and delayed monitoring, within the given restrictions: As the preservation of equilibrium
values from delayed-monitoring games to the instant-monitoring variant holds trivially (the
players may just buffer the received signals until an admissible delay period passed, and then
respond), we obtain that the set of pure equilibrium payoffs is the same, whether signals are
delayed or not—although, of course, the underlying equilibrium strategies differ between the
two variants. In terms of possible equilibrium payoffs, these games are hence robust under
changing signalling delivery guarantees, as long as the maximal delays are commonly known.
In particular, payoff-related results obtained for the instant-signalling variant apply directly
to the delayed variant.
Thirdly, the transfer procedure has some algorithmic content. When we set out with finite-
state equilibrium strategies for the instant-monitoring game, the procedure will also yield a
profile of finite-state strategies for the delayed-monitoring game. Hence, the construction
is effective, and can be readily applied to cases where synthesis procedures for finite-state
equilibria in games with instant monitoring exist.
Related literature
One motivation for studying infinite games with delays comes from the work of Shmaya [14]
considering sequential games on finitely branching trees (or equivalently, on finite graphs)
where the actions of players are monitored perfectly, but with arbitrary finite delays. In the
setting of two-player zero-sum games with Borel winning conditions, Shmaya shows that
these delayed-monitoring games are determined in mixed strategies. Apart of revealing that
infinite games on finite graphs are robust under monitoring delays, the paper is enlightening
for its proof technique which relies on a reduction of the delayed-monitoring game to a
game with a different structure that features instant monitoring but, in exchange, involves
stochastic moves.
Our analysis is inspired directly from recent work of Fudenberg, Ishii, and Kominers [8]
on infinitely repeated games with bounded-delay monitoring whith stochastically distributed
observation lags. The authors prove a transfer result that is much stronger than ours, which
also covers the relevant case of discounted payoffs (modulo a controlled adjustment of the
discount factor). The key idea for constructing strategies in the delayed-response game is to
modify strategies from the instant-response game by letting them respond with a delay equal
to the maximal monitoring delay so that all players received their signals. This amounts to
combining different threads of the instant-monitoring game, one for every time unit in the
delay period. Thus, the proof again involves a reduction between games of different structure,
with the difference that here one game is reduced to several instances of another one.
Infinitely repeated games correspond to the particular case of concurrent games with only
one state. This allows applying classical methods from strategic games which are no longer
accessible in games with several states [13]. Additionally, the state-transition structure of our
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setting induces a combinatorial effort to adapt the delayed-response strategies from [8]: As
the play may reach a different state until the monitoring delay expires, the instant-monitoring
threads must be scheduled more carefully to make sure that they combine to a valid play of
the delayed-monitoring variant. In particular, the time for returning to a particular game
state may be unbounded, which makes it hard to deliver guarantees under discounted payoff
functions. As a weaker notion of patience, suited for games with state transitions, we consider
payoff aggregation functions that are shift-invariant and submixing, as introduced by Gimbert
and Kelmendi in their work on memoryless strategies in stochastic games [9].
Our model generalises concurrent games of infinite duration over finite graphs. Equilibria
in such models have been investigated for the perfect-information case, and it was shown
that it is decidable with relatively low complexity whether equilibria exist, and if this is
the case, finite-state equilibrium profiles can be synthesised for several cases of interest in
automated verification. Ummels [15] considers turned-based games with parity conditions
and shows that deciding whether there exists a pure Nash equilibrium payoff in a given range
is an NP-complete problem. For the case of concurrent games with mean-payoff conditions,
Ummels and Wojtczak [16], show that the problem for pure strategies is still NP-complete,
whereas it becomes undecidable for mixed strategies. For the case of concurrent games with
Büchi conditions, that is, parity conditions with priorities 1 and 2, Bouyer et al. [3] show that
the complexity of the problem drops to PTime. These results are in the setting of perfect
information about the actual game state and perfect monitoring. However, as pointed out in
the conclusion of [3], the generic complexity increases when actions are not monitored by
any player.
The basic method for constructing equilibria in the settings of perfect monitoring relies
on grim-trigger strategies that react to deviations from the equilibrium path by turning to a
zero-sum coalition strategy opposing the deviating player. Such an approach can hardly work
under imperfect monitoring where deviating actions cannot be observed directly. Alternative
approaches for constructing equilibria without relying on perfect monitoring comprise, on
the one hand distributed winning strategies for games that allow all players of a coalition to
attain the most efficient outcome [10, 7, 2], and at the other extreme, Doomsday equilibria,
proposed by Chatterjee et al. in [6], for games where any deviation leads to the most inefficient
outcome, for all players.
2 Games with delayed signals
There are n players 1, . . . , n and a distinguished agent called Nature. We refer to a list
x = (xi)1≤i≤n that associates one element xi to every player i as a profile. For any such
profile, we write x−i to denote the list (xj)1≤j≤n,j 6=i where the element of Player i is omitted.
Given an element xi and a list x−i, we denote by (xi, x−i) the full profile (xi)1≤i≤n. For
clarity, we always use superscripts to specify to which player an element belongs. If not
quantified explicitly, we refer to Player i to mean any arbitrary player.
2.1 General model
For every player i, we fix a set Ai of actions, and a set Y i of signals; these sets are finite.
The action space A consists of all action profiles, and the signal space Y of all signal profiles.
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2.1.1 Transition structure
The transition structure of a game is described by a game graph G = (V,E) over a finite
set V of states with an edge relation E ⊆ V ×A× Y × V that represents transitions labelled
by action and signal profiles. We assume that for each state v and every action profile a,
there exists at least one transition (v, a, y, v′) ∈ E.
The game is played in stages over infinitely many periods starting from a designated
initial state v0 ∈ V known to all players. In each period t ≥ 1, starting in a state vt−1,
every player i chooses an action ait, and Nature chooses a transition (vt−1, at, yt, vt) ∈ E,
which determines a profile yt of emitted signals and a successor state vt. Then, each player i
observes a set of signals depending on the monitoring structure of the game, and the play
proceeds to period t+ 1 with vt as the new state.
Accordingly, a play is an infinite sequence v0, a1, y1, v1, a2, y2, v2 · · · ∈ V (AY V )ω such
that (vt−1, at, yt, vt) ∈ E, for all t ≥ 1. A history is a finite prefix v0, a1, y1, v1, . . . , at, yt, vt ∈
V (AY V )∗ of a play. We refer to the number of stages played up to period t as the length of
the history.
2.1.2 Monitoring structure
We assume that each player i always knows the current state v and the action ai she is
playing. However, she is not informed about the actions or signals of the other players.
Furthermore, she may observe the signal yit emitted in a period t only in some later period
or, possibly, never at all.
The signals observed by Player i are described by an observation function
γi : V (AY V )+ → 2Y i ,
which assigns to every nontrivial history pi = v0, a1, y1, v1, . . . , at, yt, vt with t ≥ 1, a set of
signals that were actually emitted along pi for the player:
γi(pi) ⊆ {yir ∈ Y i | 1 ≤ r ≤ t}.
For an actual history pi ∈ V (AY V )∗, the observed history of Player i is the sequence
βi(pi) := v0, ai1, zi1, v1, . . . , ait, zit, vt
with zir = γi(v0, a1, y1, v1, . . . , ar, yr, vr), for all 1 ≤ r ≤ t. Analogously, we define the
observed play of Player i.
A strategy for player i is a mapping si : V (Ai2Y iV )∗ → Ai that associates to every
observation history pi ∈ V (Ai2Y iV )∗ an action si(pi). The strategy space S is the set of all
strategy profiles. We say that a history or a play pi follows a strategy si, if ait+1 = si(βi(pit)),
for all histories pit of length t ≥ 0 in pi. Likewise, a history or play follows a profile s ∈ S, if
it follows the strategy si of each player i. The outcome out(s) of a strategy profile s is the
set of all plays that follow it. Note that the outcome of a strategy profile generally consist of
multiple plays, due to the different choices of Nature.
Strategies may be partial functions. However, we require that for any history pi that
follows a strategy si, the observed history βi(pi) is also included in the domain of si.
With the above definition of a strategy, we implicitly assume that players have perfect
recall, that is, they may record all the information acquired along a play. Nevertheless, in
certain cases, we can restrict our attention to strategy functions computable by automata
with finite memory. In this case, we speak of finite-state strategies.
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2.1.3 Payoff structure
Every transition taken in a play generates an integer payoff to each player i, described by
a payoff function pi : E → Z. These stage payoffs are combined by a payoff aggregation
function u : Zω → R to determine the utility received by Player i in a play pi as ui(pi) :=
u( pi(v0, a1, y1, v1), pi(v1, a2, y2, v2), . . . ). Thus, the profile of utility, or global payoff, functions
ui : V (AY V )ω → R is represented by a profile of payoff functions pi and an aggregation
function u, which is common to all players.
We generally consider utilities that depend only on the observed play, that is, ui(pi) =
ui(pi′), for any plays pi, pi′ that are indistinguishable to Player i, that is, βi(pi) = βi(pi′). To
extend payoff functions from plays to strategy profiles, we set
ui(s) := inf{ui(pi) | pi ∈ out(s)}, for each strategy profile s ∈ S.
Overall, a game G = (G, γ, u) is described by a game graph with a profile of observation
functions and one of payoff functions. We are interested in Nash equilibria, that is, strategy
profiles s ∈ S such that ui(s) ≥ ui(ri, s−i), for every player i and every strategy ri ∈ Si.
The payoff w = ui(s) generated by an equilibrium s ∈ S is called an equilibrium payoff. An
equilibrium payoff w is ergodic if it does not depend on the initial state of the game, that is,
there exists a strategy profile s with u(s) = w, for every choice of an initial state.
2.2 Instant and bounded-delay monitoring
We focus on two particular monitoring structures, one where the players observe their
component of the signal profile instantly, and one where each player i observes his private
signal emitted in period t in some period t + dit, with a bounded delay dit ∈ N chosen by
Nature.
Formally, a game with instant monitoring is one where the observation functions γi
return, for every history pi = v0, a1, y1, v1, . . . , at, yt, vt of length t ≥ 1, the private signal
emitted for Player i in the current stage, that is, γi(pi) = {yit}, for all t ≥ 1. As the value is
always a singleton, we may leave out the enclosing set brackets and write γi(pi) = yit.
To model bounded delays, we consider signals with an additional component that repre-
sents a timestamp. Concretely, we fix a set Bi of basic signals and a finite set Di ⊆ N of
possible delays, for each player i, and consider the product Y i := Bi ×Di as a new set of
signals. Then, a game with delayed monitoring is a game over the signal space Y with obser-
vation functions γi that return, for every history pi = v0, a1, (b1, d1), v1, . . . , at, (bt, dt), vt
of length t ≥ 1, the value
γi(pi) = {(bir, dir) ∈ Bi ×Di | r ≥ 1, r + dir = t}.
In our model, the role of Nature is limited to choosing the delays for observing the emitted
signals. Concretely, we postulate that the basic signals and the stage payoffs associated
to transitions are determined by the current state and the action profile chosen by the
players, that is, for every global state v and action profile a, there exists a unique profile
b of basic signals and a unique state v′ such that (v, a, (b, d), v′) ∈ E, for some d ∈ D;
moreover, for any other delay profile d′ ∈ D, we require (v, a, (b, d′), v′) ∈ E, and also that
pi(v, a, (b, d), v′) = pi(v, a, (b, d′), v′). Here again, D denotes the delay space composed of the
sets Di. Notice that under this assumption, the plays in the outcome of a strategy profile s
differ only by the value of the delays. In particular, all plays in out(s) yield the same payoff.
To investigate the effect of observation delays, we will relate the delayed and instant-
monitoring variants of a game. Given a game G with delayed monitoring, the corresponding
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instant-monitoring game G′ is obtained by projecting every signal yi = (bi, di) onto its first
component bi and then taking the transition and payoff structure induced by this projection.
As we assume that transitions and payoffs are independent of delays, the operation is well
defined.
Conversely, given a game G with instant monitoring and a delay spaceD, the corresponding
game G′ with delayed monitoring is obtained by extending the set Bi of basic signals in G to
Bi×Di, for each player i, and by lifting the transition and payoff structure accordingly. Thus,
the game G′ has the same states as G with transitions E′ := {(v, a, (b, d), w) | (v, a, b, w) ∈
E, d ∈ D}, whereas the payoff functions are given by p′i(v, a, (b, d), w) := pi(v, a, b, w), for
all d ∈ D.
As the monitoring structure of games with instant or delayed monitoring is fixed, it is
sufficient to describe the game graph together with the profile of payoff functions, and to
indicate the payoff aggregation function. It will be convenient to include the payoff associated
to a transition as an additional edge label and thus represent the game simply as a pair
G = (G, u) consisting of a finite labelled game graph and an aggregation function u : Zω → R.
2.3 Shift-invariant, submixing utilities
Our result applies to a class of games where the payoff-aggregation functions are invariant
under removal of prefix histories and shuﬄing of plays. Gimbert and Kelmendi [9] identify
these properties as a guarantee for the existence of simple strategies in stochastic zero-sum
games.
A function f : Zω → R is shift-invariant, if its value does not change when adding an
arbitrary finite prefix to the argument, that is, for every sequence α ∈ Zω and each element
a ∈ Z, we have f(aα) = f(α).
An infinite sequence α ∈ Zω is a shuﬄe of two sequences ϕ, η ∈ Zω, if N can be partitioned
into two infinite sets I = {i0, i1, . . . } and J = {j0, j1, . . . } such that αik = ϕk and αjk = ηk,
for all k ∈ N. A function f : Zω → R is called submixing if, for every shuﬄe α of two
sequences ϕ, η ∈ Zω, we have
min{f(ϕ), f(η)} ≤ f(α) ≤ max{f(ϕ), f(η)}.
In other words, the image of a shuﬄe product always lies between the images of its factors.
The proof of our theorem relies on payoff aggregation functions u : Zω → R that are
shift-invariant and submixing. Many relevant game models used in economics, game theory,
and computer science satisfy this restriction. Prominent examples are mean payoff or limsup
payoff, which aggregate sequences of stage payoffs p1, p2, · · · ∈ Zω by setting:
mean-payoff(p1, p2, . . . ) := lim sup
t≥1
1
t
t∑
r=1
pr, and
limsup(p1, p2, . . . ) := lim sup
t≥1
pt.
Finally, parity conditions which map non-negative integer payoffs p1, p2, . . . called priori-
ties to parity(p1, p2, . . . ) = 1 if the least priority that occurs infinitely often is even, and 0
otherwise, also satisfy the conditions.
2.4 The transfer theorem
We are now ready to formulate our result stating that, under certain restrictions, equilibrium
profiles from games with instant monitoring can be transferred to games with delayed
monitoring.
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I Theorem 2.1. Let G be a game with instant monitoring and shift-invariant submixing
payoffs, and let D be a finite delay space. Then, for every ergodic equilibrium payoff w in G,
there exists an equilibrium of the D-delayed monitoring game G′ with the same payoff w.
The proof relies on constructing a strategy for the delayed-monitoring game while
maintaining a collection of virtual plays of the instant-monitoring game on which the given
strategy is queried. The responses are then combined according to a specific schedule to
ensure that the actual play arises as a shuﬄe of the virtual plays.
3 Proof
Consider a game G = (G, u) with instant monitoring where the payoff aggregation function u
is shift-invariant and submixing, and suppose that G admits an equilibrium profile s. For an
arbitrary finite delay space D, let G′ be the delayed-monitoring variant of G. In the following
steps, we will construct a strategy profile s′ for G′, that is in equilibrium and yields the same
payoff u(s′) as s in G.
3.1 Unravelling small cycles
To minimise the combinatorial overhead for scheduling delayed responses, it is convenient to
ensure that, whenever the play returns to a state v, the signals emitted at the previous visit
at v have been received by all players. If every cycle in the given game graph G is at least as
long as any possible delay, this is clearly satisfied. Otherwise, the graph can be expanded
to avoid small cycles, e.g., by taking the product with a cyclic group of order equal to the
maximal delay.
Concretely, let m be the greatest delay among maxDi, for all players i. We define a new
game graph Gˆ as the product of G with the additive group Zm of integers modulo m, over the
state set {vj | v ∈ V, j ∈ Zm} by allowing transitions (vj , a, b, v′j+1), for every (v, a, b, v′) ∈ E
and all j ∈ Zm, and by assigning stage payoffs pˆi(vj , a, b, v′j+1) := pi(v, a, b, v′), for all
transitions (v, a, b, v′) ∈ E. Obviously, every cycle in this game has length at least m.
Moreover, the games (Gˆ, u) and (G, u) are equivalent: Since the index component j ∈ Zm is
not observable to the players, the two games have the same sets of strategies, and profiles
of corresponding strategies yield the same observable play outcome, and hence the same
payoffs.
In conclusion, we can assume without loss of generality that each cycle in the game
graph G is longer than the maximal delay maxDi, for all players i.
3.2 The Frankenstein procedure
We describe a strategy f i for Player i in the delayed monitoring game G′ by a reactive
procedure that receives observations of states and signals as input and produces actions as
output.
The procedure maintains a collection of virtual plays of the instant-monitoring game. More
precisely, these are observation histories for Player i following the strategy si in G, which we
call threads. The observations collected in a thread pi = v0, ai1, (bi1, di1), v1, . . . , air, (bir, dir), vr
are drawn from the play of the main delayed-monitoring game G′. Due to delays, it may
occur that the signal (bir, dir) emitted in the last period of a thread has not yet been received.
In this case, the signal entry is replaced by a special symbol #, and we say that the thread
is pending. As soon as the player receives the signal, the placeholder # is overwritten with
the actual value, and the thread becomes active. Active threads pi are used to query the
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strategy si; the prescribed action ai = si(pi) is played in the main delayed-monitoring game
and it is also used to continue the thread of the virtual instant-monitoring game.
To be continued, a thread must be active and its current state needs to match the actual
state of the play in the delayed-monitoring game. Intuitively, threads advance more slowly
than the actual play, so we need multiple threads to keep pace with it. Here, we use a
collection of |V |+ 1 threads, indexed by an ordered set K = V ∪ {ε}. The main task of the
procedure is to schedule the continuation of threads. To do so, it maintains a data structure
(τ, h) that consists of the threads τ = (τk)k∈K and a scheduling sequence h = h[0], . . . , h[t] of
indices from K, at every period t ≥ 0 of the actual play. For each previous r < t, the entry
h[r] points to the thread according to which the action of period r + 1 in the actual play has
been prescribed; the last entry h[t] points to an active thread that is currently scheduled for
prescribing the action to be played next.
The version of Procedure Frankensteini for Player i, given below, is parametrised by the
game graph G with the designated initial state, the delay space Di, and the given equilibrium
strategy si in the instant-monitoring game. In the initialisation phase, the initial state v0
is stored in the initial thread τε to which the current scheduling entry h[0] points. The
remaining threads are initialised, each with a different position from V . Then, the procedure
enters a non-terminating loop along the periods of the actual play. In every period t, it
outputs the action prescribed by strategy si for the current thread scheduled by h[t] (Line
5). Upon receiving the new state, this current thread is updated by recording the played
action and the successor state; as the signal emitted in the instant-monitoring play is not
available in the delayed-monitoring variant, it is temporarility replaced by #, which marks
the current thread as pending (Line 7). Next, an active thread that matches the new state is
scheduled (Line 9), and the received signals are recorded with the pending threads to which
they belong (Line 11 – 14). As a consequence, these threads become active.
3.3 Correctness
In the following, we argue that the procedure Frankensteini never violates the assertions in
Line 4, 8, and 13 while interacting with Nature in the delayed-monitoring game G′, and thus
implements a valid strategy for Player i.
Specifically, we show that for every history
pi = v0, a1, (b1, d1), v1, . . . , at, (bt, dt), vt
in the delayed-monitoring game that follows the prescriptions of the procedure up to period
t > 0, (1) the scheduling function h[t] = k points to an active thread τk that ends at state vt,
and (2) for the state vt+1 reached by playing at+1 := si(τk) at pi, there exists an active
thread τk′ that ends at vt+1. We proceed by induction over the period t. In the base case,
both properties hold, due to the way in which the data structure is initialised: the (trivial)
thread τε is active, and for any successor state v1 reached by a1 := si(τε), there is a fresh
thread τv1 that is active. For the induction step in period t+ 1, property (1) follows from
property (2) of period t. To verify that property (2) holds, we distinguish two cases. If vt+1
did not occur previously in pi, the initial thread τvt+1 still consists of the trivial history vt+1,
and it is thus active. Else, let r < t be the period in which vt+1 occurred last. Then, for
k′ = h[r], the thread τk′ ends at vt+1. Moreover, by our assumption that the cycles in G are
longer than any possible delay, it follows that the signals emitted in period r < t−m have
been received along pi and were recorded (Line 12–14). Hence, τk′ is an active thread ending
at vt+1, as required.
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Procedure: Frankensteini(G, v0, Di, si)
// initialisation
1 τε := v0; h[0] = ε
2 foreach v ∈ V do τv := v
// play loop
for t = 0 to ω do
3 k := h[t]
4 assert (τk is an active thread)
5 play action ai := si(τk) // ait+1
6 receive new state v // vt+1
7 update τk := τk ai#v
8 assert (there exists an index k′ 6= k such that τk′ ends at state v)
9 set h[t+ 1] to the least such index k′
10 receive observation zi ⊆ Bi ×Di // zit+1
11 foreach (bi, di) ∈ zi do
12 k := h[t− di]
13 assert (τk = ρ#v′, for some prefix ρ, state v′)
14 update τk := ρ(bi, di)v′
end
end
To see that the assertion of Line 13 is never violated, we note that every observation
history βi(pi) of the actual play pi in G′ up to period t corresponds to a finitary shuﬄe of the
threads τ in the t-th iteration of the play loop, described by the scheduling function h: The
observations (air, (br, dr)i, vr) associated to any period r ≤ t appear at the end of τh[r], if the
signal (br, dr)i was delivered until period t, and with the placeholder #, otherwise.
In summary, it follows that the reactive procedure Frankensteini never halts, and it
returns an action for every observed history βi(pi) associated to an actual history pi that
follows it. Thus, the procedure defines a strategy f i : V (Ai2Y iV )∗ → Ai for Player i.
3.4 Equilibrium condition
Finally, we show that the interplay of the strategies f i described by the reactive procedure
Frankensteini, for each player i, constitutes an equilibrium profile for the delayed-monitoring
game G′ yielding the same payoff as s in G.
According to our remark in the previous subsection, every transition taken in a play pi
that follows the strategy f i in G′ is also observed in some thread history, which in turn
follows si. Along the non-terminating execution of the reactive Frankensteini procedure,
some threads must be scheduled infinitely often, and thus correspond to observations of plays
in the perfect-monitoring game G. We argue that the observation by Player i of a play that
follows the strategy f i corresponds to a shuﬄe of such infinite threads (after discarding finite
prefixes).
To make this more precise, let us fix a play pi that follows f i in G′, and consider the
infinite scheduling sequence h[0], h[1], . . . generated by the procedure. Since there are finitely
D. Berwanger and M. van den Bogaard 317
many thread indices, some must appear infinitely often in this sequence; we denote by Li ⊆ K
the subset of these indices, and look at the least period `i, after which only threads in Li are
scheduled. Then, the suffix of the observation βi(pi) from period `i onwards can be written
as a |Li|-partite shuﬄe of suffixes of the threads τk for k ∈ Li.
By our assumption that the payoff aggregation function u is shift-invariant and submixing,
it follows that the payoff ui(pi) lies between min{ui(τk) | k ∈ Li} and max{ui(τk) | k ∈ Li}.
Now, we apply this reasoning to all players to show that f i is an equilibrium profile with
payoff u(s).
To see that the profile f in the delayed-monitoring game G′ yields the same payoff as s in
the instant-monitoring game G, consider the unique play pi that follows f , and construct Li, for
all players i, as above. Then, all threads of all players i follow si, which by ergodicity implies,
for each infinite thread τk with k ∈ Li that ui(τk) = ui(s). Hence min{ui(τk) | k ∈ Li} =
max{ui(τk) | k ∈ Li}= ui(pi), for each player i, and therefore u(f) = u(s).
To verify that f is indeed an equilibrium profile, consider a strategy gi for the delayed-
monitoring game and look at the unique play pi that follows (f−i, gi) in G′. Towards a
contradiction, assume that ui(pi) > ui(f). Since ui(pi) < max{ui(τk) | k ∈ Li}, there must
exist an infinite thread τk with index k ∈ Li such that ui(τk) > ui(f) = ui(s). But τk
corresponds to the observation βi(ρ) of a play ρ that follows s−i in G, and since s is an
equilibrium strategy we obtain ui(s) ≥ ui(ρ) = ui(τk), a contradiction. This concludes the
proof of our theorem.
3.5 Finite-state strategies
The transfer theorem makes no assumption on the complexity of equilibrium strategies in the
instant-monitoring game at the outset; informally, we may think of these strategies as oracles
that the Frankenstein procedure can query. Moreover, the procedure itself runs for infinite
time along the periods the play, and the data structure it maintains grows unboundedly.
However, if we set out with an equilibrium profile of finite-state strategies, it is straight-
forward to rewrite the Frankenstein procedure as a finite-state automaton: instead of storing
the full histories of threads, it is sufficient to maintain the current state reached by the
strategy automaton for the relevant player after reading this history, over a period that is
sufficiently long to cover all possible delays.
I Corollary 3.1. Let G be a game with instant monitoring and shift-invariant submixing
payoffs, and let D be a finite delay space. Then, for every ergodic payoff w in G generated
by a profile of finite-state strategies, there exists an equilibrium of the D-delayed monitoring
game G′ with the same payoff w that is also generated by a profile of finite-state strategies.
4 Conclusion
We presented a transfer result that implies effective solvability of concurrent games with a
particular kind of imperfect information, due to imperfect monitoring of actions, and delayed
delivery of signals. This is a setting where we cannot rely on grim-trigger strategies, typically
used for constructing Nash equilibria in games of infinite duration for automated verification.
Our method overcomes this obstacle by adapting the idea of delayed-response strategies of [8]
from infinitely repeated games, with one state, to arbitrary finite state-transition structures.
Our transfer result imposes stronger restrictions than the one in [8], in particular, it does
not cover discounted payoff functions. Nevertheless, the class of submixing payoff functions
is general enough to cover most applications relevant in automated verification and synthesis.
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The restriction to ergodic payoffs was made for technical convenience. We believe it is
not critical for using the main result: The state space of every game can be partitioned
into ergodic regions, where all initial states lead to the same equilibrium value. As the
outcome of every equilibrium profile will stay within an ergodic region, we may analyse each
ergodic region in separation, and apply standard zero-sum techniques to combine the results.
A challenging open question is whether the assumption of perfect information about the
current state can be relaxed.
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